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Abstract
Even though Gandhi is often cited in the debate on religious conversion in India, his 
viewpoints have not been systematically analyzed. One reason is that his writings pres-
ent a confounding blend of concepts derived from different traditions. The article 
argues that this fact provides a unique entry point into Gandhi’s thought. By looking for 
systematic patterns in his distortive use of English-language terms and ideas, the back-
ground ideas that have structured his reasoning can be traced. The conceptual distor-
tions in Gandhi’s writings are shaped by these ideas, which reflect typical Indian 
attitudes and modes of thought on the question of religion and conversion. Analyzing 
his writings in this way not only allows for an explanation of his views on religion and 
his antagonism to conversion, but also clarifies the widespread unease towards Christian 
proselytism in contemporary India.
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 Conversion in India
Religious conversion remains one of the contentious issues that divide con-
temporary India.2 From the nineteenth century until today, the hostility 
towards proselytism has rarely been far away from the center stage of national 
debate (Heredia 2007; Kim 2003). Several state governments have enacted free-
dom of religion laws that ban certain forms of conversion to Christianity or 
Islam and require registration of converts. In recent years, the issue has gained 
international attention, with interventions by the United Nations, the U.S. 
Commission on International Religious Freedom, and the Pope.
Commentators often link the opposition to conversion in Indian society to 
the ideology of Hindu nationalism (Menon 2003; Sarkar 2007; Viswanathan 
2007). However, there are major obstacles in substantiating this account — 
one such obstacle is the role of Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi. Probably 
one of the most recurring sentences in today’s conversion debate is Gandhi’s: 
“If I had the power and could legislate, I should certainly stop all proselytizing” 
(61:46).3 While Gandhi is known for his pursuit of Hindu-Muslim unity and his 
respect for Christianity, he also articulated reservations against its practices 
of proselytization. He did not only oppose proselytization, but also expressed 
his incomprehension towards conversion in the sense of an individual con-
verting from one religion to another: “I cannot understand a man changing 
the religion of his forefathers at the instance of another” (33:100–101). In this 
respect, his views seem to resonate with many moderate Indians who show 
varying degrees of incomprehension and unease towards “conversion” both in 
the transitive and the intransitive sense.4
2 There has been a lot of scholarly debate on the use of the term “conversion” and its poten-
tially different meanings in the context of India and other non-Western societies. See espe-
cially the edited volumes Hackett 2008; Buckser and Glazier 2003; Robinson and Clarke 2003; 
Bryant and Lamb 1999; see also Dube 2002; Dube and Dube 2003. I have analyzed this debate 
extensively in an earlier co-authored essay — see Claerhout and De Roover 2008. The present 
paper looks at the different problematic of the relationship between “conversion” under-
stood as a theological term and what happens to this term when it is used as a natural lan-
guage category in English, which is then adopted by people from non-Western cultures who 
speak and write in English. 
3 All references to Gandhi’s work give the volume number followed by the page number. The 
references are to the printed collected works (1964–1994, 100 vols.).
4 Often Gandhi’s claims about “conversion” contain ambiguity as to whether the term should 
be understood in the transitive sense of converting someone or in the intransitive sense of an 
individual going through a process of conversion. Part of the confusion in the Indian debate 
on religious conversion is caused by the mixing up of these two meanings of the term. I have 
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A close reading of Gandhi’s views on religion and conversion may give us an 
entry point to better understand the current clash on religious conversion in 
India. His antagonism towards conversion has long been familiar to scholars of 
religion; yet, his perspective on this issue has not yet been studied systemati-
cally. Given that Gandhi did recognize the freedom of the individual to change 
from one religion to another and that he advocated the equality of all religions, 
how should the fact that he also seemed to object to both proselytization and 
individual conversion be understood?
 Making Sense of Gandhi
Interpreting Gandhi’s writings is never an easy task. He said many things and 
used many different words to say those things. His vocabulary is often mislead-
ing. Many of his ideas are “buried in a porridge of saintly rhetoric, of ‘purity of 
heart,’ ” as Akeel Bilgrami puts it (2001:55). Scholars connect Gandhi’s views on 
religion to the particulars of his biography, especially his political life (Arnold 
2001; Parekh 1997; Tidrick 2006), or they seem to take his words at face value 
(Seshagiri Rao 1990; Seshagiri Rao 1999; Singh and Singh 2004). Explaining the 
conceptual logic behind Gandhi’s claims is a challenge. Though much inter-
esting work with this focus has been done (see Bilgrami 2003; Bilgrami 2011; 
Chatterjee 1983; Dalton 2012; Dhareshwar 2010; Jordens 1998; Parel 2006; Skaria 
2011), much more needs to be done.5
Any reader of Gandhi’s writings on religion and conversion confronts the 
challenge of making sense of his claims. His writings consist of arguments 
developed over several decades and in response to various circumstances. 
Gandhi uses English-language terms in idiosyncratic ways and with unusual 
connotations. Consequently, one regularly faces prima facie inconsistencies in 
his claims. For instance, he says he detests conversion and fails to understand 
its rationale, but also declares it highly desirable.6 In one passage, Gandhi states 
that he regards Christianity as “equally true” with his own religion, while he 
just announced that he does “not accept the orthodox teaching that Jesus was 
or is God incarnate in the accepted sense that he was or is the only son of God” 
(23:85–86). The implication is that the core doctrine of orthodox Christianity 
is false. In spite of such apparent inconsistencies, several authors note, there is 
retained this ambiguity in my analysis of Gandhi’s writings, except in sections where clarify-
ing the specific sense of the term is relevant to the argument. 
5 For an interesting overview of recent Gandhi scholarship, see Dalton 2012:212–221.
6 See next section for illustrative quotations.
56 Claerhout
Numen 61 (2014) 53–82
a deeper integrity to his thought (Bilgrami 2003; Bilgrami 2011; Chatterjee 1983; 
Dhareshwar 2010; Iyer 1973). I will argue that the reason why this is not clear 
at first sight is that Gandhi’s use of English-language terms is “distortive” in a 
particular sense. That is, he relates notions such as religion, conversion, truth, 
and equality to each other in unexpected ways. The result is a specific kind of 
conceptual distortion.7
Let me explain what is meant by “conceptual distortion” here. My use of 
this term does not have any normative or pejorative connotation; “distortion” 
is used as a technical term. When today’s scholars and their readers discuss 
the subject of religion in languages like English, they invoke all kinds of com-
mon ideas. For instance, they usually assume that each people or culture has 
some form of religion and that “belief” and “worship” are central to religion, 
that religions can have one God or many gods, and that this corresponds to the 
distinction between “monotheism” and “polytheism.” Some of these common-
places have their origin in Christian theological discourse, others in modern 
philosophy. Many have been elaborated into theories about religion or system-
atic descriptions of the different “religions” of humanity. I would like to intro-
duce the technical term “topos” (plural “topoi”) to refer to such common ideas 
that have been developed into theories.
Topoi are not simply isolated ideas but occur as clusters of interrelated 
ideas. As has been argued elsewhere, the interpretation and elaboration of all 
such topoi depend on the presence of other common ideas.8 That is, the topoi 
about religion that circulate in Western society are intelligible and produc-
tive as clusters of ideas because of a shared conceptual background, which 
allows us to interpret these ideas and elaborate on them. Topoi require this 
background to continue to function as common ideas for the culture or society 
in question. This does not mean that these clusters of common ideas are fixed 
immemorial. They change and evolve and can be interpreted and articulated 
in many different ways. The topoi can also be modified, combined and re-
combined creatively in ways that lead to conceptual change. Yet, this happens 
7 Gandhi’s particular use of certain words has been pointed out in different contexts and argu-
ments by many Gandhi scholars. For instance, Akeel Bilgrami refers to this in relation to 
words like “reason” and “moral sense” (2011:95). Dennis Dalton also points to the differences 
between Western notions of political liberty and swaraj in Gandhi’s understanding (2012:2–
8). In this article, this problem is tackled by speaking in terms of “conceptual distortion.”
8 These ideas on topoi were developed by S. N. Balagangadhara and are only briefly summa-
rized here. For a more elaborate explanation, see De Roover, Claerhout, and Balagangadhara 
2011:578–581.
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within certain conceptual limits, because crossing these limits would entail 
the loss of coherence and intelligibility for the relevant cluster of ideas.
In this essay, I would like to define “conceptual distortion” as the process 
that occurs when topoi originating from one cultural setting are interpreted 
against another cultural background — that is, by making use of topoi or com-
mon ideas from another culture. In their use of the English language, Gandhi’s 
writings in English and the translations of his Gujarati writings invoke certain 
common ideas and phrases that were inherent to the idiom of his time. The 
focus of this essay is on Gandhi’s English writings, as this is how he has primar-
ily been read by the rest of India and the world.9 The aim of my interpreta-
tion of his claims on “religion” and “conversion” is not so much to discover the 
original meaning that Gandhi himself intended. Rather it is to identify those 
conceptual distortions in the use of English-language terms and concepts that 
Gandhi regularly invoked. It is my hypothesis that these conceptual distortions 
are caused by the background clusters of common ideas that Gandhi shared 
with other educated people raised in the India of his time.
Of course, these common ideas or topoi shared by groups of educated 
Indians were not invariant. As was the case in Europe, not all common ideas 
circulating in Indian society were shared by all members of that society. It is 
for empirical research to determine the geographical and sociological scope 
of certain topoi. That is, specific research projects will be needed to find out 
the extent to which some particular cluster of common ideas was indeed 
common across the educated classes of India. In the case of Gandhi’s state-
ments on “religion” and “conversion,” however, we do have some indications 
that his peculiar use of certain terms and ideas is not purely idiosyncratic: his 
claims and his language use resonated with many of his contemporaries and 
later generations of Indians. Several passages by Gandhi are still being quoted 
approvingly in the contemporary debate on religious conversion in India. Take 
the above-mentioned example: “If I had the power and could legislate, I should 
certainly stop all proselytizing.” Irrespectively of what Gandhi meant by this 
statement, the fact that it seems to resonate with so many Indians’ aversion 
towards conversion indicates that there may be interesting links here between 
9 In his introduction to the 1997 edition of Hind Swaraj, the famous Gandhi-scholar Anthony 
Parel makes an interesting observation about Gandhi’s own translation of Hind Swaraj into 
English: “As such, the English text of this work . . . possesses an authority all of its own. It was 
this text that Tolstoy and Romain Rolland, Nehru and Rajaji read and commented upon. It 
was through this, not the Gujarati text, that he hoped, as he put it, ‘to use the British race’ for 
transmitting his ‘mighty message of ahimsa’ to the rest of the world” (2009:xxv). See Skaria 
2002 for the tension between reading Gandhi in English and in Gujarati.
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Gandhi’s thought and certain attitudes and modes of reasoning that are fairly 
widespread in India.
How then can we interpret Gandhi’s writings on “religion” by taking into 
account their conceptual distortions? Metaphorically, it helps to think in terms 
of two layers: at the surface, there is the layer of Gandhi’s claims on religion 
and conversion, where he makes use not just of English-language terms and 
phrases, but also (through them, as it were) of Western topoi. Underneath this 
lies a more fundamental conceptual layer that we need to dig up, where Gandhi 
calls on the topoi of his own cultural traditions to make sense of these Western 
topoi. This second layer reflects Indian modes of reasoning about the nature 
of traditions, the role of reason, the meaning of truth, and changes within and 
between traditions. To a large extent, Gandhi’s use of English-language terms 
is mapped onto the conceptual schemes of this deeper layer. That is, he adopts 
typical formulae from Christian theology and Western philosophy but in the 
process of interpreting these maps them onto Indian topoi.
In the surface layer, then, we face a confounding conceptual blend of East 
and West (Arnold 2001:13; Parel 2006:x). Nevertheless, the surface layer offers 
an interesting access point to the deeper layer. This is the case, because the 
conceptual distortion does not occur at random but in a systematic way. 
The systematic nature of the distortions, I propose, expresses the structure 
of the topoi that lie behind Gandhi’s claims and interpretations of English-
language terms. Furthermore, these topoi or common ideas derive from the 
background theories of the Indian traditions that have shaped his reasoning. 
Tracking such underlying ideas allows one to characterize basic structures of 
these traditions.
This is not the same as saying that Gandhi derived his ideas both from 
Western and Indian philosophy and that it therefore helps to consult the dual 
linguistic sources of his thought (Parel 2000:1–3). This is true, but the interpre-
tive challenge we face goes even deeper: we have to uncover the systematic 
patterns in the conceptual distortion in Gandhi’s use of Western topoi. Once 
we have circumscribed such patterns, we can begin to develop hypotheses on 
the underlying ideas expressed in these conceptual distortions.10
Why not move straight to Gandhi’s writings in Gujarati to reconstruct this 
fundamental conceptual layer? It seems likely that in his Indian-language 
10 This opens up a route to engage in comparative research. As Balagangadhara puts it in his 
Reconceptualizing India Studies: “Indians reproduce Western descriptions as Indians 
understand them . . . This addition opens up a way for us to study, too, in a comparative 
way. There is a pattern and systematicity to the Indian transformation of Western 
descriptions of other cultures, the cultural world and themselves” (2012:90).
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writings the topoi of Indian culture must be more clearly present at the sur-
face. This might indeed be the case. But there is one element that needs to 
be kept in mind: at a certain point, the interpreters of Gandhi’s writings in 
Gujarati and in English (and in any other translation for that matter) will con-
front similar difficulties. The problem is that most dominant ideas that we 
use today in the social sciences and humanities to think about “religion” are 
topoi that have emerged from Western-Christian history and were formulated 
in European languages. While translating the Gujarati texts — to English, for 
instance, so that we can share the insights with the scholarly community — 
contemporary scholars and their readers will inevitably take recourse to these 
clusters of ideas to interpret Gandhi’s thought. We may then be less aware of 
the distortion that we as interpreters inflict upon his thought, because we lack a 
vantage point to discern such distortions. In contrast, Gandhi’s texts in English 
provide us with a vantage point that compels us to recognize the problem of 
conceptual distortion. Therefore, this paper explores the heuristic opportuni-
ties of this vantage point — without of course discounting the importance of 
reading Gandhi’s writings in Gujarati in the on-going efforts to better under-
stand his thought.
In this essay, I will analyze the “conceptual distortions” in Gandhi’s writ-
ings on religious conversion in order to excavate the deeper layer of common 
Indian ideas about this subject. The following section reveals some specific dif-
ficulties in making sense of Gandhi’s claims about “conversion” and “religion.” 
This allows me to identify instances where topoi from one culture are inter-
preted against a different cultural background. In the third section, I theorize 
the conceptual framework that is expressed in Gandhi’s distortions. This leads 
to new insights into the Indian topoi that shaped his thinking and helps me 
explain the growing opposition to conversion in modern India.
 What Does India Need: Tradition or Conversion?
The issues of conversion and proselytization were central to Gandhi’s thought 
for many decades. He writes about them in response to different contexts, but 
the activities of Christian missionaries draw his special attention. From the 
start, his writings show ambiguity towards conversion. He strongly opposes 
the missionaries’ use of humanitarian work in order to convert people to their 
religion: “Will not the great missionary bodies of India, to whom she owes a 
deep debt of gratitude for what they have done and are doing, do still better 
and serve the spirit of Christianity better, by dropping the goal of proselytising 
but continuing their philanthropic work?” (13:219–225). According to Gandhi, 
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conversion harms the Indian social fabric: it always leaves a sore behind. This is 
certainly the case with active proselytizing, but Gandhi also appears to have in 
mind cases where an individual decides to leave the tradition in which he was 
born in order to convert to Christianity. Conversions to Christianity, he sug-
gests, often lead to immoral behavior and to an attitude that is un-Indian, un-
national, and disrespectful of Indian traditions (28:91–93). On the other hand, 
Gandhi asserts that conversion entails “a life of greater dedication to one’s own 
country, greater surrender to God, greater self-purification” (ibid.). Here, he 
relates conversion to a search for truth and characterizes it as “a new birth,” “a 
change of heart,” and “a definite giving up of evil.” He understands the spiritual 
quest of Christians as an expression of this human quest for inner conversion 
towards a pure and moral way of life (13:219–225).
How should we account for these two apparently conflicting positions? One 
way of doing so is to suggest that Gandhi intends to distinguish between exter-
nal proselytization through material means — of which he disapproves — and 
a spiritual process of true inner conversion that he encourages. This contrast 
is familiar from Christian intellectual traditions. Especially after the Protestant 
Reformation, it has played a central role in Western reasoning about religion. 
One of the recurring themes in the work of the Magisterial Reformers of six-
teenth-century Europe was that the Christian believers of their time were only 
nominal Christians who had adopted the external trappings of religion but 
whose souls had not gone through the spiritual process of “conversion” in the 
sense of turning towards the true God and submitting oneself to Him. Hence, 
a new kind of focus came to lie on conversion as the intra-Christian process 
by which a believer gradually becomes a true Christian. This process of con-
version or “new birth,” they argued, was the core of Christian religion, which 
should shape the lives of all believers.
In the course of its history, Christian theology has attributed a number 
of defining properties to conversion. Even though the different branches 
and thinkers of Christian theology gave many different interpretations of 
conversion, a rough sketch of the outer limits within which the main theo-
logians of the Magisterial Reformation understood this process can be given 
nevertheless.11 For some process to qualify as a process of conversion, certain 
11 This rough sketch is based on a study of the understanding of conversion in the works of 
important Reformation thinkers such as Martin Luther, John Calvin, Philip Melanchthon, 
Martin Bucer, and Katharina Schütz Zell (see Claerhout 2010). Along with this analysis of 
a body of primary sources, the following selection of secondary works is helpful in 
understanding the nature of this process of conversion in post-Reformation Christianity: 
Citron 1951; Brauer 1978; Caldwell 1983; Harran 1983; Hendrix 2004; Morrison 1992; 
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necessary conditions need to be fulfilled. First, it concerns a spiritual change — 
a purification of the soul or spiritual nature of humanity but not of the sinful 
body. What or who is being transformed spiritually? The soul or spirit is the 
main object of this spiritual transformation. The core of the transformation 
is that one is no longer occupied with earthly matters but gets insight into the 
spiritual domain. This is what the phrase “new birth” signifies and this is why it 
is an internal Christian process (see Citron 1951). This presupposes an anthro-
pology that divides the human being into two natures, the soul and the body. 
Conversion redirects our entire being from the material, this-worldly to the 
spiritual, other-worldly sphere. Second, conversion can start only with the help 
of the biblical God. By human effort alone, we cannot attain anything worth-
while spiritually. Human beings should not interfere in the lives of each other’s 
souls. Only the faith given by God and His Word can instigate the process of 
conversion. Humanity depends solely on His grace to transform our hearts, 
minds, and lives. Third, conversion is the mechanism that restores the sight of 
the sinner and makes one see the inherent iniquity of our nature. This transi-
tion is the “change of heart” and “new birth.” Fourth, conversion never comes to 
completion in this life on earth. As long as human beings are clenched to their 
carnal bodies, the process cannot be completely fulfilled. Finally, this process 
of conversion requires the structures and strictures of true religion: Scripture 
as the revealed word of God, and its correct interpretation. Even though the 
Protestant-Christian traditions are not a monolithic entity, the dominant 
theological interpretations of conversion in the Magisterial Reformation gave 
importance to these properties.
At first sight, Gandhi appears to be discussing the same process, since he 
invokes the terminology of “new birth” and “change of heart” (13:219–225), and 
suggests, “conversion is a heart-process known only to and by God” (32:515–
516). But it soon becomes clear that he cannot have the same thing in mind: 
he attributes properties to conversion that are incompatible with the above 
picture. First, Gandhi’s “change of heart” is an achievement of the satyagrahi 
or “truth-seeker” as a human being, rather than a process that can be initi-
ated and sustained only by God. He views non-violence (ahimsa) as a process 
of conversion that aims at reforming the satyagrahis morally and spiritually 
Muldoon 1997. In recent times the theology of religions (with authors like Jacques Dupuis 
and John Hick) has focused on the problem of how to deal with religious pluralism in the 
world and its relation to (spreading) the Christian message. However, this rich literature 
cannot be examined here, as this is outside the scope of the concerns of this essay. Though 
this implies a reduction of complexity, I limit myself to sketching some general boundaries 
of the theology of conversion found in the central works of the Magisterial Reformation. 
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(23:478). Second, it is not a process of turning away from the earthly material 
realm but one of transforming oneself and other people in society. The leaders 
of India have to go through this process of conversion in order to bring about 
the necessary change in others. Gandhi describes non-cooperation as a pro-
cess of conversion, whereby Indians have to convert through their model con-
duct even the staunchest of British colonials (23:41, 30:134, 35:98–100). Third, 
according to him, “a new birth, a change of heart, is perfectly possible in every 
one of the great faiths,” not just in one true religion. Ideally, conversion should 
take place within the tradition in which one is born and there is no concern 
about the truth or falsity of this tradition (13:219–225).
From this, I conclude that Gandhi is not so much talking about the distinc-
tion between true spiritual inner conversion and external proselytization by 
material means. At first blush, he may sound like a mainstream Protestant-
Christian believer when he adopts this terminology, but he uses the terms in 
unexpected ways and attributes new combinations of properties to the process 
of conversion. Such points of divergence offer potential windows into the pat-
terns of reasoning that gave shape to Gandhi’s use of the relevant terms and 
phrases.
 Religion and Transformation
As an entry point for understanding Gandhi’s objections to conversion, take 
his claims about the spirit of “swadeshi” or self-sufficiency in matters of reli-
gion. According to him, Hinduism is a tradition with a powerful swadeshi spirit, 
and this explains why it does not proselytize: “By reason of the swadeshi spirit, 
a Hindu refuses to change his religion not necessarily because he considers it 
to be the best, but because he knows that he can complement it by introducing 
reforms” (ibid.). Originally, swadeshi had been an economic strategy to reduce 
India’s dependence on British products and promote the production of Indian 
goods.12 Gandhi extends this notion to the religious sphere and suggests that 
it entails that we should limit ourselves to our ancestral religion and immedi-
ate religious surroundings. If one’s religion is deemed defective, it should be 
purged of its defects, rather than left behind (ibid.).
He attributes this swadeshi spirit to all great “faiths” of the world — 
including Christianity. If Christians were to understand that genuine con-
version takes place within one’s own tradition, they would stop investing in 
12 “Swadeshi: things pertaining to one’s own country.” Anthony Parel clearly explains the 
different levels of swadeshi in a footnote in Gandhi’s Hind Swaraj (2009:21).
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proselytism. Missionary activity, Gandhi suggests, sprouts from a flawed inter-
pretation of Christianity, which understands the message “Go Ye unto All the 
World” narrowly and misses its spirit (ibid.). It is because Christian humanitar-
ian work ultimately aims at converting people to Christianity that the work 
of the missionaries suffers (28:295–301). Instead of convincing others that 
some religion is superior, one should retain tradition and try to improve it, so 
Gandhi argues.
This shows how Gandhi’s reasoning clashes with the classical understanding 
of conversion as the change from one religion to another, where the truth value 
of religious beliefs is the decisive factor, rather than their provenance. The best 
stance in religion is to make use of one’s immediate religious surroundings, 
he suggests, and Christians should adopt this stance, even though — from a 
Christian point of view — this is equivalent to subordinating religion to the 
accidents of birth and geography. To draw a stark contrast: to a Calvinist con-
vert originally born into a Roman-Catholic family, this appeal to swadeshi 
amounts to the claim that he should remain steeped in “false religion” and 
condemned to “eternal damnation,” while he knows “the truth.”
Gandhi repeatedly expresses his incomprehension towards practices that 
try to make people replace their religion with another and also to cases where 
individuals convert from one religion to another (33:100–101). He also objects 
to the practices of shuddhi that nineteenth-century Hindu reform movements 
had introduced in order to “re-convert” Muslims and Christians to Hinduism:
My Hindu instinct tells me that all religions are more or less true. All pro-
ceed from the same God, but all are imperfect because they have come 
down to us through imperfect human instrumentality. The real shuddhi 
movement should consist in each one trying to arrive at perfection in his 
or her own faith. In such a plan character would be the only test. What is 
the use of crossing from one compartment to another, if it does not mean 
a moral rise? (24:148–149)
Here, shuddhi is described as a process whereby the individual achieves a 
greater moral perfection “in his or her own faith” and which is incompatible 
with crossing from one religion to another.
There are three dimensions central to Gandhi’s understanding of conver-
sion. First, he encourages “conversion” but only as a process of moral growth 
within one’s own tradition. This generates an important question: Is conver-
sion between religions acceptable if there is a moral rise of the individual? 
Gandhi allows for this possibility but is not convinced that conversion to 
Christianity brings this about (30:312, 35:461–464). Abstractly speaking, the 
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possibility of converting to another religion is an ever-present option to the 
individual. However, its reference point does not rest in the truth-value of reli-
gious teachings but in moral considerations. Conversion to another religion is 
justified only in so far as it makes an individual morally superior compared 
to before. From this perspective, Gandhi implies, it is both unnecessary and 
divisive, since all great religions are bearers of excellent moral guidelines and 
capable of internal improvement.
The second dimension is that Gandhi attributes to every individual a respon-
sibility to transform and purify his own tradition, whenever he feels that it 
contains immoral elements. The prototypical case is the problem of untouch-
ability in Hinduism. In this context, he again uses the term “conversion” in 
two ways: conversion to another religion as a way of escaping untouchability, 
and conversion as the process Hindus have to undergo to uplift their tradition 
by eradicating untouchability. The first, he suggests, is not a proper remedy, 
because “no physical inconvenience can warrant abandonment of one’s own 
religion,” and “untouchability is no part of Hinduism,” but “rather its excres-
cence to be removed by every effort” (18:376–377). Gandhi describes the threat 
to abandon Hinduism as a betrayal of one’s faith. A religion can survive only if 
its followers help eradicate its impurities. Conversion of Hinduism in the sense 
of removing untouchability is the task at hand. The claim that “the campaign 
against untouchability is not one of compulsion, but of conversion” is a recur-
ring refrain in Gandhi’s writings (52:374, 53:260–261, 293). Here Gandhi’s use 
of “conversion” also indicates that it concerns a process where Hindus change 
their practices because they themselves become convinced that this should 
happen and not because they are forced to. But most importantly it concerns 
a process of internal transformation of a tradition. Without this type of “con-
version,” Hinduism might as well perish (62:280–281, 63:33–39). Consequently, 
taking recourse to conversion to another religion implies that reform within 
one’s own religion has become impossible.
The third dimension of Gandhi’s discussion of “conversion” concerns the 
attempt to transform other human beings. In his text Why I Am a Hindu (1927), 
he addresses this question when he responds to the request of an American 
friend to compare Hinduism with the teachings of Christ. He points out that 
faith is not something that can be transmitted by persuading others. Hence, it 
is impossible to compare Christianity with Hinduism in this way:
I have ventured at several missionary meetings to tell English and 
American missionaries that if they could have refrained from “telling” 
India about Christ and had merely lived the life enjoined upon them by 
the Sermon on the Mount, India instead of suspecting them would have 
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appreciated their living in the midst of her children and directly profited 
by their presence. Holding this view, I can “tell” American friends noth-
ing about Hinduism by way of “return.” I do not believe in people telling 
others of their faith, especially with a view to conversion. Faith does not 
admit of telling. It has to be lived and then it becomes self-propagating. Nor 
do I consider myself fit to interpret Hinduism except through my own life. 
And if I may not interpret Hinduism through my written word, I may not 
compare it with Christianity. (35:166–167)13
Religion, so Gandhi stresses, does not spread by persuading others about its 
truth claims. The only thing that can be done is to “live” and “interpret” a reli-
gion in one’s own life. In Gandhi’s view, when we are able to morally transform 
our lives and truly embody the guidelines of our religion in our experience 
and action, we will automatically begin to have a moral impact on our sur-
roundings and transform the lives of others. To put it in terms of a famous 
phrase often ascribed to Gandhi (but not found in his printed works): “Be the 
change you want to see in the world.” Gandhi often turns to the metaphor of a 
rose. A religion spreads not by persuasion or proselytization but through the 
lived experiences of its followers: “It radiates its influence silently as the rose 
its fragrance without the intervention of medium” (40:60; see also 46:27–29, 
48:121–122, 64:37).
At this level, Gandhi praises the humanitarian endeavors of Christian mis-
sionaries as an expression of how a religion is to be interpreted through the 
lives of its followers. Naturally, many Christians would agree that it is cru-
cial to embody the teachings of Christ and emulate Him. However, there is a 
marked difference here. Christian missionaries cannot limit themselves to this 
alone, since they also have to evangelize, that is, to spread the message of the 
Gospel. Just by living in a particular way, they could never transmit the propo-
sitional content of their religion.14 From observing the behavior of the mis-
sionary alone, potential converts could never infer even the minimal core of 
Christian teachings: that the biblical God exists, the role of Christ, the Trinity, 
13 Emphasis added.
14 There are a variety of Christian missiological theories that characterize different 
approaches to evangelizing and proselytization (Ustorf 2000). They range from proactively 
aiming to baptize as many people as possible to living a Christian life without actively 
trying to convert non-Christians (and waiting for them to take the initiative). However, 
whatever the missionary approach or theory one follows, the aim is to evangelize non-
Christians. To be successful, this evangelization involves the transmission of Christian 
teachings or the Gospel.
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the theology of the cross, etc. Since religion here revolves (among other things) 
around the truth of its doctrines about God, humanity, and salvation, the mis-
sionary is compelled to transmit this by persuading others.
 The Question of Religious Truth
Gandhi famously holds the view that all religions are more or less true. If all 
religions are more or less the same with respect to truth, this cannot provide a 
reason for changing from one religion to another. Gandhi formulates his view 
as follows in a much-quoted passage from his discussion on “fellowship” (1928):
I came to the conclusion long ago, after prayerful search and study and 
discussion with as many people as I could meet, that all religions were 
true and also that all had some error in them, and that whilst I hold by 
my own, I should hold others as dear as Hinduism, from which it logi-
cally follows that we should hold all as dear as our nearest kith and kin 
and that we should make no distinction between them. So we can only 
pray, if we are Hindus, not that a Christian should become a Hindu, or 
if we are Mussalmans, not that a Hindu or a Christian should become a 
Mussalman, nor should we even secretly pray that anyone should be con-
verted, but our inmost prayer should be that a Hindu should be a better 
Hindu, a Muslim a better Muslim and a Christian a better Christian . . . 
If however there is any suspicion in your minds that only one religion can 
be true and others false, you must reject the doctrine of fellowship placed 
before you. (35:461–464)15
Given the truth of all religions, it is best to follow one’s own — meaning the 
one in which one is born and raised — but hold others as dear and close. At 
first blush, this view of religious truth harbors a basic inconsistency. If all reli-
gions are true, then Christian, Islamic, and Hindu teachings should be true at 
the same time. This entails that one religious doctrine, which claims that each 
human individual has a unique soul destined for eternal salvation or damna-
tion, should be compatible with another, which asserts that there is a “transmi-
gration of souls” between individuals. This seems impossible.
Gandhi appears to have another conception of “truth” in mind than truth as 
a property of propositions, doctrines, or beliefs (see also Jordens 1987; Bilgrami 
2003; Bilgrami 2011:96; Chatterjee 1983:74; Parel 2006:195–196). Indeed, he does 
15 Emphasis added.
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not refer to the “truth” of doctrines: “By a true faith I mean one the sum total 
of whose energy is for the good of its adherents, by a false I mean that which is 
predominantly false” (35:461–464). Still, the above passage involves a peculiar 
ambiguity. When Gandhi says that he came to the conclusion that “all religions 
were true and also that all had some error in them,” the predicate “true” can-
not refer to the truth of conflicting doctrines or beliefs. But when he mentions 
other people’s belief “that only one religion can be true and others false,” he 
inevitably refers to the orthodox position of Christianity and Islam. In this 
orthodox position, “true” and “false” do also refer to the truth-value of religious 
doctrines.
This ambiguity about the meaning of “truth” in religion is common in 
Gandhi’s writings. For instance, he praises Hinduism’s lack of dogmatism as 
follows:
Its freedom from dogma makes a forcible appeal to me inasmuch as it 
gives the votary the largest scope for self-expression. Not being an exclu-
sive religion, it enables the followers of that faith not merely to respect 
all the other religions, but it also enables them to admire and assimilate 
whatever may be good in the other faiths. (35:166–167)
However, Gandhi proceeds by claiming that “Hinduism believes in the oneness 
not of merely all human life but in the oneness of all that lives” and talks about 
its “great belief in transmigration” (ibid.). This sounds as though Hinduism 
does claim truth for particular beliefs or doctrines after all.
There is a deeper conflict here. On the one hand, Gandhi’s characterization 
of Hinduism clashes with the understanding of religions as belief systems (and 
related practices that express these beliefs). Such systems consist of sets of 
beliefs that must be minimally coherent in order to make sense. While one 
can imagine that a few teachings of one religion are adopted by another, the 
minimal requirements of consistency put limits on any such process. Gandhi, 
however, suggests that one faith, Hinduism, can assimilate whatever it finds 
good in others and shows no worries about coherence. On the other hand, he 
appears to reproduce the understanding of religions as belief systems, when he 
praises Hinduism for its belief in the oneness of all that lives, the belief in the 
transmigration of souls, and the belief in the law of varnashrama. If Hinduism 
is indeed constituted by such beliefs, Hindus cannot possibly assimilate all 
valuable teachings of other religions.
What we can make out of the above is that Gandhi adopts classical ways of 
discussing “religion” in English but then uses the terms in apparently inconsis-
tent ways, making it difficult to decipher his views. In the mentioned discussion 
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on fellowship, for instance, one of the participants raises the question as to 
why preaching religious doctrines is not similar to promoting theories about 
an economic order or advocating specific laws regarding health. Gandhi’s reply 
goes as follows: “If there were different but good and true health laws for differ-
ent communities, I should hesitate to preach some as true and some as false” 
(35:461–464). On the contrary:
If in matters of medicine and other natural sciences, I feel my superi-
ority over others, a thing of which I may be legitimately conscious, and 
if I have love for my fellow beings, I would naturally share my knowl-
edge with them. But things of the spirit I leave to God and thus keep the 
bond between fellow beings and myself pure, correct and within limits. 
(36:136–137)
This comparison with the natural sciences both clarifies and confounds 
Gandhi’s standpoint. The clarification lies in the suggestion that the natural 
sciences possess criteria to assess the cognitive superiority of one theory over 
another. Therefore, spreading particular theories as scientific truth across dif-
ferent cultures and communities can be justified. In “things of the spirit,” there 
are no such criteria that could potentially justify spreading the exclusive doc-
trines of one religion.
This stance is also confounding because it depends on Gandhi’s idiosyn-
cratic uses of “religion” and “truth,” which are not shared by his dialogue part-
ners like the Christian missionaries. This becomes clear in another context, 
where an American missionary writes an open letter to Gandhi on the issue 
of conversion. The missionary points out that religious truth, like scientific 
truth, is by its very nature universal, and reproaches Gandhi for denying to 
Christians the right to share Christ with others (Kim 2003:28). Once we switch 
to this missionary’s standpoint, how puzzling Gandhi’s equivocation between 
different senses of “truth” is can be seen. To this missionary, there are criteria 
to determine which religion is universally true and, therefore, superior to other 
religions: Scripture is the supreme criterion, since it is the revelation of the 
biblical God.
This ambiguity about the meaning of “truth” lies at the heart of the chasm 
between Gandhi and the missionaries. According to him, their effort rests on 
a flawed notion of truth: “At the root of missionary effort is . . . the assumption 
that one’s own belief is true not only for oneself but for all the world; whereas 
the truth is that God reaches us through millions of ways not understood by 
us . . . spiritual superiority is a dangerous thing to feel” (36:136–137). Here, the 
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blending of several notions of truth creates further confusion. When a belief is 
true, this entails that it is true for all of humanity, even though many may not 
believe in its truth. The truth of, say, the belief that the earth revolves around 
the sun is logically independent of whatever any section of humanity believes 
to be the case. When the Christian missionary speaks of truth, he or she does 
not only mean the truth of propositions but the truth of the biblical God’s rev-
elation, which is viewed as independent from any human knowledge. The mes-
sage of God’s revelation is true not for one or two human beings but for all of 
humanity. The mutual misunderstanding surfaces again when Gandhi tells a 
Christian clergyman the following:
I am not interested in weaning you from Christianity and making you 
a Hindu, and I would not relish your designs upon me, if you had any, 
to convert me to Christianity! I would also dispute your claim that 
Christianity is the only true religion. It is also a true religion, a noble reli-
gion, and along with other religions it has contributed to raise the moral 
height of mankind. But it has yet to make a greater contribution. After all 
what are 2.000 years in the life of a religion? (64:398)16
According to the Christian missionary, Christianity is “the truth”; according 
to Gandhi, Christianity is “also true” but in a different sense. Gandhi equates 
truth to the nobility of a religion and its moral contributions and connects 
this to the age of a religion: the older it is, the greater the contribution. To 
Christian missionaries, the question of age is largely irrelevant: their religion 
is not simply a contribution to humanity but the truth for humanity. They do 
not just assume that their belief is true for all of humanity but take the only 
consistent position when a doctrine is viewed as the biblical God’s revelation 
of His will. The Christian claim is that Christianity is the unique revelation of 
God to humankind. Therefore, believers identify it as true and other religions 
as false. According to each of the different Christian confessions, its respective 
doctrine is regarded as the one true revelation of God’s will. The only road to 
salvation lies in a genuine belief in this doctrine and submission to His will. 
Gandhi ignores this point and fails to understand fully the Christian mission-
ary’s religion and its concept of truth.
This becomes clear when he expresses his incomprehension towards the 
link between the humanitarian work of Christian missionaries and their 
mission to convert others. Because of his different notion of “truth,” Gandhi 
16 Emphasis added.
70 Claerhout
Numen 61 (2014) 53–82
cannot see the link between the truth claims of religions like Christianity, and 
the fundamental moral responsibility such religions instill in their believers 
to preach their message to the world. “Go ye into all the World” has not been 
narrowly understood by the Christians, as Gandhi claims, but has shaped the 
Christian humanitarian work (and not vice versa). When missionaries, such as 
E. Stanley Jones, point out that the truth in spiritual matters needs to be told 
and that it is their right to spread this message by persuading others, he does 
not appear to grasp what they are trying to convey.
This is striking in the interesting piece “About Conversion,” where Gandhi is 
invited to comment upon a range of Christian propositions like the following: 
“The Christian believes that Jesus is the fulfillment of God’s revelation to man-
kind; that He is our Saviour, that He alone can bring the sinner to God and thus 
enable him to live” (61:454–458). His comments are illuminating:
The . . . proposition deals with the Christian belief handed to the believer 
from generation to generation, the truth of which thousands of Christians 
are never called upon to test for themselves, and rightly so. Surely it is a 
dangerous thing to present it to those who have been brought up with a 
different belief. And it would be impertinent on my part to present my 
untested belief to the professor of another which for all I know may be as 
true as mine. It is highly likely that my belief is good enough for me and 
his is for him. A thick woollen coat would be the right dress when living 
in the cold regions of the earth; a piece of loincloth would be right for 
another living in the equatorial regions. (Ibid.)
To Gandhi, “belief” appears to be something that is handed from generation 
to generation and derives its “truth” from the fact that it has been tested by 
previous generations of a people. Therefore, it is impertinent to impose the 
“beliefs” of one people on another group of people. Since “belief” has been 
shaped by local circumstances and the past of this particular people, present-
ing this “belief” to others is as absurd as telling inhabitants of the tropics that 
they should wear thick woolen coats because people living in the Arctic do so.
In the past, such passages in Gandhi’s writings have led to the claim that 
he (like other Hindus) is a kind of relativist in religious matters. This would 
indeed be the case, if Gandhi really intended to use “belief” to refer to proposi-
tions that are true or false. In that case, saying that your “belief” may be “true” 
(or “good”) for you but my “belief” is “true” (or “good”) for me would amount 
to some sort of relativism. However, I would like to suggest a different reading: 
when Gandhi discusses “beliefs,” he does not refer to propositions about the 
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world that are either true or false, but rather intends to refer to the transmit-
ted action heuristics or practical instructions handed down by a community. 
Such heuristics or instructions for action are indeed handed from generation 
to generation and accepted because they have been “tested” by earlier genera-
tions. They are not propositions about the world that are either true or false, 
but rather instructions that can be more or less helpful in particular contexts. 
In this way, Gandhi’s analogy of clothing in different climates becomes a sen-
sible one: in many cases, it is absurd to impose the action heuristics of one 
people onto another people with a completely different past and environment. 
By understanding “belief” as “transmitted action heuristic,” we can make bet-
ter sense of Gandhi’s claims. This is another instance of his conceptual dis-
tortion of English-language terms that creates difficulties in deciphering his 
viewpoints.
 Misunderstanding Distortion
I have now illustrated several such distortions in Gandhi’s writings on religion 
and conversion. What do these tell us? One could conclude — as some people 
have — that he was an incoherent thinker: he simply made use of terms from 
Christian theology without understanding them very well. However, such a 
conclusion neglects the depth of Gandhi’s struggle with these words and con-
cepts, the originality of his contribution to understanding human traditions, 
and the deeper coherence and integrity of his thought.
Am I arguing that Gandhi should have studied Christian theology more thor-
oughly? Not at all: I do not hold the theological framework of Christianity as 
the standard by which other people’s use of the same terms should be assessed. 
Neither do I attribute conceptual distortion to Gandhi’s writings because his 
vocabulary does not correspond to that sanctioned by Christian orthodoxy. It 
would not be helpful, I suggest, to put up some definition of words like “conver-
sion,” “belief,” and “truth” on the basis of Christian theology and subsequently 
show that Gandhi’s use of the words is different and therefore flawed. If that 
were the case, one could easily object by saying that it concerns a creative 
Indian appropriation of these concepts.
Instead of giving a definition of words, I aim to show that “conversion,” 
“religion,” “belief,” and “truth” are concepts embedded in larger clusters of 
common-sense ideas, where these terms are used within certain limits of 
coherence. When these limits are violated, it becomes very difficult to under-
stand what a person is trying to say. This is the case because these concepts 
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have not come into being and survived in a vacuum. They are part of larger 
clusters and networks of ideas that shape the natural language use of Western 
societies. In the case of “religion” and its cognates, this happens to be a set of 
clusters that is largely determined by Christian theology and its secularization 
(Balagangadhara 2005b; De Roover and Balagangadhara 2008; De Roover and 
Claerhout 2010).
What am I proposing then? Gandhi’s claims have been labeled as incoher-
ent. I claim that it is heuristically more fruitful to think through the apparent 
inconsistencies and take him very seriously as a systematic thinker. Gandhi’s 
writings do reveal a peculiar kind of prima facie incoherence. But what if this 
incoherence can be explained in terms of a deeper coherence? This is where 
the “principle of charity” in the interpretation of thinkers has to guide us: it 
cannot but be assumed that Gandhi uses these concepts in a way that is coher-
ent for him and for the many Indian readers who have resonated with his writ-
ings and insights. This is the minimal consistency our interpretations should 
attribute to intelligent human beings (Henderson 1993). In Gandhi’s case, this 
means that we should look for the coherent patterns behind his inconsistent 
use of terms like “religion,” “truth,” and “belief.” In other words, the background 
framework that has shaped his conceptual distortion of topoi from Western 
culture has to be reconstructed. To some extent, this framework will be deter-
mined by clusters of common ideas circulating in Indian society. In other 
words: the conceptual distortions may offer a window into the Indian topoi 
or common ideas that have structured Gandhi’s reasoning. In the next sec-
tion, I will systematize my findings and — cautiously and tentatively — begin 
this work of reconstructing the background clusters of ideas behind Gandhi’s 
views on conversion.
 Gandhi’s Religion?
How could we identify the Indian topoi that give shape to the conceptual dis-
tortions in Gandhi’s writings? One route is to compare his individual state-
ments about “conversion,” “belief,” and “truth,” and try to extract such general 
schemes or clusters of ideas. However, given the internal variety of Gandhi’s 
thought, this “inductive” approach will lead to uncertain results. The concep-
tual distortions in his writings become heuristically fruitful, if approached 
as the result of the interpretation of topoi from one culture through the topoi of 
another. Therefore, the alternative route is to formulate a general hypothesis 
on the Indian topoi or commonplaces that have functioned as the conceptual 
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background that determined Gandhi’s interpretation of Western topoi. Which 
topoi did he invoke and how do they distort Western topoi? In the remaining 
pages, I propose such a set of hypotheses that make sense of the equivocation, 
incoherence, and conceptual distortion in Gandhi’s writings on conversion. 
Naturally, these hypotheses are fallible: it may be the case that some of the 
common ideas that I attribute to Gandhi were not really held by him or that 
they will need to be refined in the future to better capture his reasoning.
First, when Gandhi speaks of “faiths” or “religions,” he refers to the traditions 
of different groups or communities. He emphasizes that one should remain 
within one’s own “faith” and advocates swadeshi and the role of heredity in reli-
gion, because he fundamentally views religions as the ancestral traditions of 
a community or group. The main characteristic of such traditions is that they 
are transmitted from generation to generation. One does not follow a tradition 
because of its teachings or the truth of its propositional content but because 
it has been passed on. In other words, traditions consist of ancestral practices, 
which are not founded in doctrines or justified by reasons. Practices do not 
embody beliefs that one holds to be true.
If traditions are continued because they are ancestral practices, how to 
account for Gandhi’s emphasis on reform, purification, and the rejection of 
practices like untouchability? It should be clear that this notion of tradition 
does not entail that any practice is defended just because it was transmitted 
by previous generations. This is a fallacy. It is not because one has no reason 
to continue a body of practices that one cannot have a reason to discontinue 
one or several of its practices. If there are good reasons to end a practice, one 
should do so. This is indeed the attitude seen in Gandhi (e.g., vis-à-vis child 
marriage, caste practices). Bilgrami also stresses that “one may apply one’s 
‘moral sense’ and ‘reason’ and be selective in embracing what was given to one, 
as he [Gandhi] himself certainly was in his own Hinduism” (2011:103). Typical 
to a vibrant tradition is its potential to change in this way. One can modify any 
practice so as to retain its viability or reject it if the reasons against it are com-
pelling (Chatterjee 1983:8).
This process of “purifying” a tradition from deficiencies is what Gandhi calls 
“conversion” in a positive sense: a process of transformation that takes place 
within the confines of one’s own tradition. He puts a premium on its impor-
tance, because this aspect of traditions is often ignored. He also stresses the 
particular relationship between the individual and his or her tradition. The 
individual has the duty to pursue the modification or eradication of practices, 
when there are compelling reasons to do so. If the “faith” one belongs to is 
defiled by impurities, these should be transformed. This attitude is essential to 
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the vibrancy of a tradition, and goes hand in hand with tenacity in continuing 
the tradition. This also accounts for Gandhi’s surprise at conversion to another 
religion when people barely know their own religion.17
Second, “religion” consists of the traditions of a particular community or 
group of people. It is the set of ancestral practices that has constituted some 
community. Over time, in the process of transmission and selection, earlier 
generations have filtered out practices, modified or rejected them. This explains 
the close connection in Gandhi’s thought between religious traditions and the 
welfare of peoples.18 In 1931, when he was interviewed by a newspaper about the 
role of foreign missionaries in independent India, the report said that he would 
ask them to withdraw if they engaged in proselytizing by means of medical aid 
and education. Later that same year, Gandhi expresses his anger, because the 
press had twisted his words. “This is what a reporter has put into my mouth,” 
Gandhi says: “Every nation’s religion is as good as any other. Certainly India’s 
religions are adequate for her people. We need no converting spiritually.” 
Gandhi cannot recall saying this and retouches the statement: “Every nation 
considers its own faith to be as good as that of any other. Certainly the great 
faiths held by the people of India are adequate for her people. India stands in 
no need of conversion from one faith to another” (46:27–29).
The modifications are interesting. In both versions, Gandhi attributes cer-
tain characteristics to religion: religions are connected to peoples and assessed 
in terms of their adequacy for the needs of peoples (he does not use “nation” in 
the sense of nation-state here). There is no need for conversion, because each 
group has its own religions that have historically fulfilled its needs. Apart from 
softening the tone, the last sentence is crucial in Gandhi’s correction. The issue 
is not that “we need no converting spiritually”; in fact spiritual conversion is 
desirable, but the issue is whether India stands in “need of conversion from 
one faith to another.” This last sentence must have troubled Gandhi, because it 
equivocates between the two kinds of “conversion” he distinguishes. His entire 
17 During his studies in London, friends advised him to join the Theosophical Society, but he 
declined saying: “with my meagre knowledge of my own religion I do not want to belong 
to any religious body” (Gandhi 2007:77).
18 This is not be misread as though Gandhi was supporting the agenda of Hindu nationalist 
groups by claiming that India was a Hindu nation, nor as a support to a one nation-one 
religion ideology. This would be a serious misreading of Gandhi’s ideas: he opposed the 
two-nation theory that advocated that Hindus and Muslims each constituted a separate 
nation with its own religion. Religion was not the basis for Gandhi’s civic nationalism 
(Parel 2006:35). I would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing out this possible 
misreading in an earlier draft.
 75Gandhi, Conversion, and the Equality of Religions
Numen 61 (2014) 53–82
project is a call for spiritual and moral “conversion” of the Indian nation within 
the confines of its spiritual traditions.
Third, since traditions do not have their foundation in doctrines or beliefs, 
truth predicates do not apply to them. They fall outside of the scope of applica-
bility of the predicates “true” and “false.” Gandhi equivocates between different 
senses of “truth,” but where it concerns propositional truth he should be read 
as making this point: if religions are traditions, then no religion is false. For 
instance, in 1924, a Muslim correspondent insisted that Gandhi respond to the 
following question: “You claim that you are a lover, a seeker and a follower of 
truth. You have said besides that Islam is not a false religion. It is the command 
of Khuda [God] that every person should embrace Islam. Why then haven’t 
you embraced Islam?” Gandhi’s reply is revealing:
It has nowhere been enjoined that everyone should do everything that is 
not false. Just as I do not consider Islam to be a false religion, so also do I 
not consider Christianity, Zoroastrianism or Judaism to be false religions. 
Which religion, then, should I embrace? Moreover, I do not consider 
Hinduism a false religion either. What, then, should one like me, a seeker 
of truth, do? (25:221)
For the letter writer, Gandhi’s claim that Islam is not a false religion entails 
that he must embrace it as the one true religion. Gandhi does not follow the 
same logic: to him, Islam is not a false religion, because no religion is false 
(not because Islam is the one true religion). Since no religion is false, the best 
route to follow is to maintain the religion in which one is born: “Hence I cling 
to my religion, as a child to its mother. But I have no dislike for other religions, 
as a child has none for other mothers” (ibid.). In other words: “I therefore 
prefer to retain the label of my forefathers so long as it does not cramp my 
growth and does not debar me from assimilating all that is good anywhere 
else” (31:350–351).
Fourth, traditions do not consist only of ancestral practices, but also of 
action heuristics that instruct the individual on how to become a better human 
being. Unlike religious doctrines and other beliefs about the world, such heu-
ristics or rules of thumb are not subject to truth claims. They are instructions 
for action, whose efficacy is always relative to the experience, context (dif-
ferent cultures, communities, families, groups, etc.), and inclinations of the 
individual in question. In other words, they function like signposts and their 
efficacy always depends on the specific situation of the individual in question 
(Balagangadhara 2005a).
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This aspect of traditions as sets of action heuristics allows us to decipher 
many of Gandhi’s claims about religion as self-realization or knowledge of the 
self (Gandhi 2007:45). It explains why he views religions as moral guidelines, 
all of which are valid. Since such heuristics are not bearers of truth claims, 
nothing prevents them from migrating from one tradition to another. Unlike 
beliefs about the world, they are not restricted by requirements of consistency. 
Taking into account this characteristic of traditions, Gandhi’s suggestion that 
one religion can assimilate valuable aspects of another religion makes perfect 
sense. It also explains his stance that a tradition’s loss of the capacity to insti-
gate moral or spiritual growth in a community or a human being is synony-
mous to its death. This would entail that the tradition’s action heuristics no 
longer work for its followers.
We cannot preach such action heuristics and insist that others accept them. 
Since the efficacy of heuristics depends on a range of things — the experi-
ence, background, context (including the group and family within which one 
is born), and inclinations of the individual — it does not even make sense 
to persuade anyone of their virtues. The role of such heuristics is to generate 
certain kinds of action, both internally as modes of reflection and externally as 
particular attitudes towards oneself and others in the world. Inevitably, then, 
the best way to express such instructions for action is by embodying the kind 
of actions and attitudes they generate. The best way to learn such heuristics 
is not through verbal expression and reproduction but through mimesis of 
actions and attitudes.19 Most often such mimesis occurs in a subliminal way. 
This accounts for Gandhi’s statements on the self-propelling nature of religion 
and his simile of the rose and its fragrance.
It also allows us to take the next step in decoding his notions of “religion” 
and “truth.” He uses “true” and “false” in a pragmatic sense, rather than in terms 
of the semantic conception of truth: truth is that which helps an individual to 
reach his goal. “Truth” refers to the efficacy of action heuristics in enabling the 
individual to progress in the process of moral and spiritual growth. For this 
reason, Gandhi keeps emphasizing that all religions have some truth and some 
error in them; all traditions contain practices and action heuristics that are 
more or less efficacious. As traditions, religions are essentially human products 
19 On the meaning of “setting the example” and its difference from generating principles for 
all human beings, see Bilgrami 2011:100–101. Explaining Gandhi’s notion of exemplarity, he 
writes: “A truly religious person in this world is someone who has come to live with this 
level of ahimsa, and, in that ideal of religion, the very idea of principles (or doctrines) is 
replaced by the idea of exemplarity” (ibid.:101).
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that are transmitted from generation to generation. Consequently, all contain 
the imperfections that are typical of any human product.
Fifth, many interpreters view the “equality of all religions” as the founda-
tion of Gandhi’s reasoning on religious conversion. Often, however, this idea 
is reduced to a slogan. Taking into account the above hypothesis, how should 
this notion of equality of religions be understood? If the religious traditions of 
a people or community are sufficient to meet its needs, what are the implica-
tions of the claim that all religions are equal? If Gandhi’s statements are taken 
seriously, it follows that religious traditions are equal in the sense that they 
meet the needs of particular communities. It is their function to do so. This 
does not imply, however, that the needs of one community are necessarily 
equal to the needs of other communities. In that case, the religion that satis-
fies the need of some particular community could be “more” or “less” than the 
other, in so far as one can speak in these terms about the needs of people.
Consider again the modifications in the famous example: “Every nation’s 
religion is as good as any other” was replaced by “Every nation considers its 
own faith to be as good as that of any other.” This indicates that Gandhi’s point 
is not that all religions are “equal” or “as good as any other,” but that all nations 
consider their traditions to be so. Functionally, in meeting the needs of a cer-
tain people, they are symmetrical. I believe that this is the best way to make 
sense of utterances like the following: “Accept all religions as equal, for all have 
the same root and the same laws of growth” (64:203).
Briefly put, Gandhi advocates the functional symmetry between traditions: 
in their function of providing action heuristics to people and, as such, in fulfill-
ing the needs of a people and a community, traditions are symmetrical. This 
is very different from saying that all religions are equal. Even though Gandhi 
often expresses his idea in terms of “equality” or “equal truth,” the notion of 
functional symmetry better captures the message he aims to convey. It is less 
susceptible to misinterpretation than the idea of equality of religions, since 
it avoids attributing equal “truth” to all religious doctrines and running into 
inconsistency.
More, it also avoids the suggestion that Gandhi’s claims about “equality” 
are all about giving “equal respect” to other religions. In 1930, Gandhi rejected 
the formula of “respect” and introduced “equality of religions” (44:166–167). 
Hence interpreting his “equality of religions” as equal respect for all religions 
is ill advised. Similarly, he did not like the word “tolerance” because of its con-
notation of condescension (Iyer 1973:246). Rather than “respecting” or “toler-
ating” other religions, Gandhi incites one to study them and learn from them. 
The notion of functional symmetry helps us understand why: religions are of 
“equal value” in so far as they provide action heuristics to pursue spiritual and 
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moral growth; consequently, adopting such action heuristics from other tradi-
tions can enrich one’s own tradition.
Finally, this hypothesis allows clarification of Gandhi’s antagonism to con-
version and explains the incomprehension towards Christian proselytism in 
India. If “religion” is the tradition or set of ancestral practices that constitute 
a community, then proselytizing will inevitably be experienced as an unwel-
come and disruptive intrusion into the communal life of such traditions. Given 
that traditions as sets of practices and action heuristics are not bearers of truth 
predicates, the charge that a tradition is “false religion” and should be replaced 
by “true religion” becomes incomprehensible. Moreover, such a stance hinders 
the members of certain traditions from learning from the action heuristics at 
their disposal. Traditions possess the resources to change and reject harm-
ful practices or heuristics, rather than be replaced as a whole. In fulfilling 
the needs of a people or community, traditions stand in a relation of func-
tional symmetry. Under these conditions, proselytizing becomes absurd and 
uncalled for — or a hindrance to spiritual and moral growth. It is because of 
this, I would like to claim, that conversion in India is often experienced as a 
violation of the integrity of a community and its tradition.
 Conclusion
During the last six decades, Gandhi has been pushed into the corner of moral 
sainthood and sometimes he “seems more revered than understood” (Mishra 
2007:5). Interest in his writings most often takes the form of fascination with 
the life of this extraordinary individual. This approach misses the uniqueness 
of Gandhi’s contribution to systematic thinking about humanity and its cul-
tures. I would like to suggest that a range of deep-rooted Indian attitudes and 
modes of reasoning are reflected in Gandhi’s writings. In this article I have 
aimed to demonstrate that the conceptual distortion in his use of terms such as 
“conversion,” “belief,” and “truth” can be systematically studied and explained 
by theorizing the clusters of common ideas that give shape to this distortion. 
This provides a new perspective in the interpretation of the writings of Gandhi 
and other Asian thinkers.
As such, the case of Gandhi remains highly relevant to contemporary 
debates on religion and conversion. Gandhi’s reasoning shows that one can-
not brand all opposition to conversion as yet another manifestation of Hindu 
nationalism20 — a tendency that is clearly present in today’s debate on reli-
20 Of interest here are Gandhi’s conflicts with his contemporary V. D. Savarkar, the Hindu 
nationalist leader (Neufeldt 2003).
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gious conversion in India. His insights open up a new perspective on today’s 
incomprehension and resentment towards practices of conversion and pros-
elytization in India and elsewhere. His reflections also offer a more promis-
ing route towards addressing the anti-conversion sentiment shared by many 
Indians, without taking the retrograde step of implementing legislation that 
bans proselytization.
The case of Gandhi shows how Indian culture and its intellectual traditions 
hold the potential of offering alternative conceptual resources for theory for-
mation in the contemporary study of religion, culture, and politics. For too 
long, the academic world has assumed that the building of theoretical frame-
works in the human and social sciences is somehow the privilege of thinkers 
from Europe or North America.21 The result is that these sciences have often 
presented the experience of one culture as though it is the universal human 
experience (Balagangadhara 2012).
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